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This article proposes a new test called the “Anonymous Public Concern Test” which incorporates public 
concern analysis in enforcing Internet Service Provider [ISP] subpoenas in online defamation suits.  
Anonymous speech is an important aspect of First Amendment rights that warrants protection.  Current 
tests used by courts to analyze whether to enforce ISP subpoenas are either too pro-plaintiff or too pro-
defendant.  The article’s proposed “Anonymous Public Concern Test” is the best approach in dealing with 
ISP subpoenas because it protects both anonymous speech and preserves online defamation plaintiffs’ 
rights. 
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Patrick Cahill was a local City Councilman in the town of Smyrna, Delaware.1  Beginning in 
2004 Cahill began to openly break with the Smyrna Mayor Mark Schaeffer on a number of local 
issues.2  These differences between Councilman Cahill and Mayor Schaeffer did not go 
unnoticed within the Smyrna community.  Beginning in September of 2004 several people began 
posting comments online on the “Smyrna/Clayton issues blog” about the tension between 
Councilman Cahill and the Mayor.3  These posts were all anonymous and were posted under the 
usernames “Proud Citizen;” “Saw it All;” “Me too;” and “Screwed U All.”4  Their comments 
ranged from criticism of Cahill’s ability to serve as a local councilman to commentary on 
Cahill’s marriage and personal life.5  One anonymous posting commented on Cahill’s aptitude 
and ability as a City Councilman.6  The anonymous blogger wrote: 
“If only Councilman Cahill was able to display the same leadership skills, energy and 
enthusiasm toward the revitalization and growth of the fine town of Smyrna as Mayor 
Schaeffer has demonstrated!...Cahill has devoted all of his energy to being a divisive 
impediment to any kind of cooperative movement.  Anyone who has spent any amount of 
time with Cahill would be keenly aware of such character flaws, not to mention an 
obvious mental deterioration.  Cahill is a prime example of failed leadership—his 
eventual ousting is exactly what Smyrna needs….”7 
Other postings were less political, and took the forms of personal attacks on Cahill and his wife 
Julia.8  An anonymous blogger wrote: 
                                                          
1 Cahill v. Jon Doe No. One, 879 A.2d 943, 946 (Del. Super. 2005) rev’d, John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 
(Del. 2005). 
2 Cahill, 879 A.2d at 946. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 946-48. 
6 Id. at 946. 
7 Id. at 946. 
8 Id. at 946-947 
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“I have to say that I would be embarrassed to be associated with the scum of the earth Pat 
and Julia [Cahill].  Everybody in town talks about how freaky they are.  Not to mention 
the fact that Julia has screwed…or at least tried to screw half the people in town!  That 
just goes to show that she’s nothing but a “bottom of the barrel scum sucking whore”!! 
[sic]  While I am thinking about it why don’t Pat and Julia take their boat and shove it up 
their asses…I hear Pat likes that kind of stuff.”9 
Other bloggers went further accusing Councilman Cahill’s wife of being a prostitute, stating that 
she had left him, and that she regularly committed adultery.10  One blogger went so far as to 
write that Cahill and his wife “couldn’t have sex because he [Councilman Cahill] has Hepititis 
[sic] C.  Now she’s [Julia Cahill] living in Dover with her BIG blond girlfriend and they both go 
out to the bars most nights trying to pick up guys.”11 
 The Cahills eventually brought suit against the online bloggers for defamation.12  The 
Cahills did not know the true identity of these bloggers so they had to request their identities 
from Independent Newspapers, Inc., who maintained the blog, and later Comcast, who was the 
Internet Service Provider (ISP).13  At this point victims of online defamation must petition courts 
to force ISPs to tell plaintiffs who these anonymous posters are.14  This places courts in the 
difficult position of having to decide between telling defamation plaintiffs the true identity of a 
defendant verses protecting an anonymous online speaker’s right to remain unidentified.15  
This example of these online comments concerning the Cahills illustrates the competing 
interests courts’ face in enforcing ISP subpoenas in online defamation suits.  While some 
                                                          
9 Id. at 946-947. 
10 Id. at 947. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 945. 
13 Id. at 948. 
14 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, *1 (Va.Cir. Ct. 2000). 
15 Ashely Kissenger, Katherine Larson, Untangling the Legal Labyrinth;  Protections for Anonymous Online Speech, 
13 No. 9 J. Internet L. 1, 16 (2010). 
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postings online are legitimate commentary that rises to the level of highly protected political 
speech; other postings are simply defamation.  The varying types of online postings coupled with 
the importance courts give to anonymous speech present an interesting and difficult decision for 
courts.  While anonymous speech has been considered to be an extremely important aspect of 
free speech, anonymous defamation presents a major problem with online forums such as blogs.   
Even though there is no universally accepted approach to analyze ISP subpoenas, several 
courts have created their own tests.16  Creating a fair test is difficult because courts must 
simultaneously uphold the integrity of anonymous speech while affording defamation plaintiffs 
the right to know the identity of defendants.  Because of the tension of these incompatible 
interests the current tests either lean heavily in favor of plaintiffs or defendants.  Three cases 
represent the approaches and difficulties courts have had in developing a standard method to 
evaluate ISP subpoenas.17  This tension is illustrated in the pro-plaintiff test outlined in the 
Virginia Circuit Court case of In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc. (AOL)18 
and the pro-defendant tests from New Jersey and Delaware in the cases of Dendrite Intern. Inc. 
v. John Doe No. 3 (Dendrite) and John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, (Cahill).19  None of these tests 
achieve the goal of providing an effective method for plaintiffs to discover the true identity of 
online defamers without violating online bloggers’ right to remain anonymous. 
This article presents a new test that protects anonymous speech while striking a fair 
balance between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ rights.  The “Anonymous Public Concern Test” 
incorporates the history of protection of anonymous speech and addresses the critiques of various 
                                                          
16 Id. at 17. 
17 Clay Calvert, Kayla Gutierrex, Karla D. Kennedy, Kara Carnley Murrhee, David Doe v. Goliath, Inc.:  Judicial 
Ferment in 2009 For Business Plaintiffs Seeking the Identities of Anonymous Online Speakers, 43 J. Marshall L. 
Rev. 1, 15, 15-16 (2009). 
18 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372 (Va.Cir.Ct. 2000) rev’d on other 
grounds, America Online Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 542 S.E.2d 377 (2001). 
19 Dendrite Intern., Inc. v. John Doe, No. 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134 (2001); John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 
(Del. 2005). 
 
 
4 
 
pro-plaintiff, pro-defendant, and hybrid tests employed by courts today.  This article presents a 
new test that utilizes an initial “matter of public concern” test that is later coupled with a pro-
plaintiff analysis to evaluate when ISP subpoenas should be enforced.20   
This article explores anonymous speech, ISP subpoenas, and proposes a new approach to 
evaluate ISP subpoenas in three sections.  Section I explores the history and jurisprudence 
surrounding anonymous speech and association within the First Amendment.  Section II 
examines and critiques the various pro-plaintiff, pro-defendant, and hybrid tests used by courts to 
determine when to enforce ISP subpoenas.  Last, in Section III the article proposes a new  
“Anonymous Public Concern Test” as the best method for courts to use in order to determine 
when to enforce an ISP subpoena.  From these sections this article shows the importance of 
anonymous speech and illustrates the failure of current tests in evaluating ISP subpoenas.  This 
article presents the new “Anonymous Public Concern Test” which is a new test that seeks to 
remedy the pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant biases of current tests while preserving the right to 
speak anonymously.  This is accomplished by incorporating the U.S. Supreme Court’s standards 
used in workplace speech cases along with current tests used in online defamation.21  
Incorporating workplace speech analysis into this new test makes logical sense because both 
issues involve a type of proportional balancing between conflicting interests of speakers’ rights 
against other interests, e.g. workplace harmony and plaintiffs’ rights.  This novel approach of this 
new test provides the best analysis for protecting online speakers’ rights preserving defamation 
plaintiffs’ right to know the identity of defendants.  Using this new approach not only borrows 
from established case law, but it provides an operationalized framework for balancing these 
competing rights of plaintiffs and defendants. 
                                                          
20 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734 (1968). 
21 Id.; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983). 
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I. Anonymity and the First Amendment 
 Anonymous speech has been consistently viewed as part of the First Amendment by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  However, the issue of anonymous speech in online defamation suits has 
never been directly addressed by the Court.  Anonymity has been analyzed by the Court in both 
written speech22 and association.23  While these two areas of anonymity are different, both 
illustrate that anonymity within American speech and politics has a rich history and a high value 
to the Supreme Court.24  
A.  Anonymous Writings 
The U.S. Supreme Court has evaluated regulations on anonymous speech using exacting 
scrutiny.25  Exacting scrutiny analysis requires the statute restricting anonymous speech to be 
“narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”26  This high level of scrutiny can be 
justified by the importance anonymous speech plays within American society and social 
movements.  Commenting on the importance of anonymous speech within history Justice Hugo 
Black wrote:  
“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important 
role in the progress of mankind.  Persecuted groups and sects from time to time 
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either 
anonymously or not at all.” 27   
This view of the important role anonymous speech has in political discourse was a major 
underpinning in Justice Black’s majority opinion in Talley v. California (Talley), which struck 
                                                          
22 Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536 (1960); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct 
1511 (1995). 
23 NAACP v. Ala., 367 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163 (1958). 
24 Talley, 362 U.S. 60; McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449. 
25 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-347. 
26 Id. at 347. 
27 Talley, 362 U.S. at 64. 
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down a local ordinance requiring handbills to contain the author’s name and address.28  In Talley 
the City of Los Angeles prosecuted a man who produced and distributed anonymous handbills 
that advocated the boycott of businesses that sold certain products by companies who practiced 
discriminatory employment practices.29  Los Angeles argued that their ordinance “is aimed at the 
prevention of ‘fraud, deceit, false advertising, negligent use of works, obscenity, and libel,’ in 
that it will aid in the detection of those responsible for spreading material of that character.”30  
However, the majority of the Court rejected this justification citing that they recently held 
anonymity was an important factor in political association.31  Justice Black pointed to the “fear 
of reprisal” as a major justification for allowing both anonymous association and speech.32  
Justice Black wrote, “It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most 
constructive purposes.”33 
Anonymous speech was again addressed by the Supreme Court in 1995 in McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Commission (McIntyre).34  Like the majority in Talley, the majority in McIntyre 
struck down an Ohio statute that banned anonymous pamphlets concerning political messages.35  
In McIntyre a woman distributed an anonymous pamphlet that criticized the local school board 
                                                          
28 Id. at 60-66. 
29 Id. at 61.  The handbill asked readers to sign and become a member of the National Consumers Mobilization.  
Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60, 61 (1960).  One the handbill contained the statement “I believe that every man should 
have an equal opportunity for employment no matter what his race, religion, or place of birth.”  Id.  at 61. 
30 Id. at 66.   
31 Id. at 65 (citing Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412 (1960)); NAACP v. Ala., 357 U.S. 449 
(1958). 
32 Id. at 65. Justice Black cited several examples from Puritan pamphleteers in seventeenth century England to the 
Federalist Papers in the newly formed United States as illustrations of the great political importance of anonymous 
speech.  Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). 
33 Id.  The dissent of Justices Clark, Frankfurter and Whittaker cited that the First Amendment did not give a 
freedom for anonymous speech.  Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60, 70 (1960).  The dissenting Justices also pointed out 
that the reasons given by Los Angeles for justifying this ordinance were “compelling.”  Id. at 67.  The dissenters 
also noted that there are other state statutes that banned anonymous publishing concerning political candidates and 
that bans on anonymous publication “expressed the overwhelming public policy of the Nation.”  Id. at 70. 
34 McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334. 
35 Id.; Talley, 362 U.S. 60. 
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concerning school taxes.36  Instead of signing her name as required by the statute she instead 
signed the pamphlet “Concerned Parents and Tax Payers.”37  Citing Justice Black’s opinion in 
Talley, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion highlighted the importance of anonymous speech in 
politics.38  Justice Stevens wrote that anonymous writings have a special place in history and 
literature.39  The majority held that even though there may be some public interest in the identity 
of an anonymous speaker it is ultimately the anonymous speaker’s decision to reveal 
themselves.40   
Justice Stevens held the speech banned under the Ohio statute in McIntyre was more narrowed 
than the speech banned in Talley.41  However, the speech in McIntyre was political speech 
restricted by a content based statute which is given exacting scrutiny analysis under the First 
Amendment.42   
Part of the majority’s rationale for striking down the Ohio law banning anonymous 
political pamphleteering is that anonymity itself is an important means of communication.43  
Justice Stevens recognized the importance of anonymous speech writing, “On occasion, quite 
apart from any threat of persecution, an advocate may believe her ideas will be more persuasive 
if her readers are unaware of her identity.”44  This idea is predicated on the belief that anonymity 
divorces the message from the author so readers “will not prejudge her [the author’s] message 
                                                          
36 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 336. 
37 Id. at 337. 
38 Id. at 341-345. 
39 Id. at 341-342.  Justice Stevens listed a wide variety of authors and political figures whose work was published 
anonymously.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 362 U.S. 334, 342 footnote 4 (1995).  These authors and 
political figures included Charles Dickens, Benjamin Franklin, Voltaire, George Sand, Mark Twain, Charles Lamb, 
and Shakespeare.  Id. 
40 Id. at 341. 
41 Id. at 344. 
42 Id. at 345-347.  Ohio argued that its state interest was two-fold.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 362 U.S. 
334, 348 (1995).  The Ohio statute served to stop “fraudulent and libelous statements” and ensured voters would 
receive “relevant information.”  Id. at 348.  The Court rejected these two justifications and found the statute 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 348-351; 357.  
43 Id. at 342. 
44 Id. at 342. 
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simply because they do like its proponent.”45  Justice Stevens also placed great importance of the 
role of anonymity in politics.46  Citing the example of the secret ballot he wrote that anonymity is 
an important political mechanism that allows a person to voice his or her views without fear.47  
Justice Thomas’ concurrence in McIntyre reiterated this point stating that the right to 
speak anonymously was inextricably intertwined with the Framers’ idea of the First 
Amendment.48  Examining eighteenth century America, Justice Thomas held that the type of 
pamphleteering found in McIntyre was exactly what the Framers were trying to protect under the 
freedom of the press.49  Commenting on the Framers’ use of anonymous speech during the 
American Revolution, Justice Thomas wrote, “the historical evidence indicates that Founding-era 
Americans opposed attempts to require that anonymous authors reveal their identities on the 
ground that forced disclosure violated the ‘freedom of the press.’”50 
Like Justice Black’s majority opinion in Talley, Justice Thomas’ concurrence in 
McIntyre gives a wide variety of examples of anonymous speech in early America.51  Beginning 
with the famous 1735 Zenger trial, Justice Thomas explained how much of the anti-British 
political movement in America stemmed from anonymous speech.52   Justice Thomas 
particularly pointed to the debates surrounding the ratification of the Constitution and the use of 
anonymous speech by Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike.53  The major concept of Justice 
Thomas’ analysis of anonymous speech is that he believes the exacting scrutiny analysis is 
                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 343. 
47 Id. at 343. 
48 Id. at 359. 
49 Id. at 360.   
50 Id. at 361. 
51 McIntyre, 362 U.S. at 361-370; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-66.   
52 McIntyre, 362 U.S. at 361-367.  Peter Zenger was an early American printer prosecuted for sedition for not 
releasing the names of anonymous authors who were writing criticism of the colonial British government of New 
York.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 514 U.S. 334, 361 (1995).  At a jury trial Zenger was acquitted.  Id. 
53 Id. at 368. 
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ultimately unnecessary because the foundational construction of the First Amendment protects 
anonymous speech.54 
B.  Anonymous Association 
In addition to anonymous speech the U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized anonymous 
association rights.55  As with anonymous speech, the Court has recognized the importance of 
anonymous association in context with political activity.  The right of association is related to the 
rights of anonymous speech; in both Talley and McIntyre there are references to Supreme Court 
cases on the right to nondisclosure of the names of members in political organizations.56  Similar 
issues arise in association disclosure cases as do in anonymous speech cases.  In NAACP v. 
Alabama the U.S. Supreme Court’s per curium opinion pointed out the various issues of 
mandatory disclosure of memberships in a political organization.57  The Court held that an 
Alabama Circuit Court could not force the NAACP to submit a list of all of their statewide 
members even though Alabama business incorporation law required such a disclosure.58  
                                                          
54 Id. at 370.  Justice Scalia’s dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist discredits Justice Thomas’ historical 
justification for protection of anonymous speech under the freedom of the press.  McIntyre v. Ohio Election 
Commn., 514 U.S. 334, 371-373 (1995).  The dissent also focuses on the historical underpinning of laws designed to 
reduce anonymous speech.  Id. at 375-376.  Justice Scalia’s writes that the ban on anonymous speech is justifiable 
because of the importance of protecting the elections and candidates from false statements.  Id. at 378-380. 
55 NAACP, 357 U.S. 449. 
56 Talley, 362 U.S. at 66 (citing NAACP v. Ala., 357 U.S. 449 (1958) as holding that states may not always force 
organizations to reveal the identities of their members); 362 U.S. at 66 (Justice Harlan’s concurrence references 
NAACP v. Ala., 357 U.S. 449  (1958) in the discussion of applying strict scrutiny to freedom of speech and 
association);  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 347  (1976)(per curiam) as holding 
that the constitution has an important role in political campaigns);  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 353 footnote 14 
(discussing a state’s interest in identifying those engaging in political speech through donations); McIntyre, 514 U.S. 
at 355-356 (discussing the difference between mandatory disclosure of identities of campaign contributions to the 
overly broad Ohio statute in McIntyre requiring all political communication to contain the author’s identity). 
57 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-463. 
58 Id. at 459-466.  Alabama state law required all foreign businesses to submit a charter to the state. NAACP v. Ala., 
357 U.S. 449,  451-452 (1958). The NAACP did not submit a charter for its newly formed field office and the State 
of Alabama petitioned for a court order to restrict the NAACP from operating their Alabama field office.  Id. at 452.  
During this lawsuit the Alabama court requested information from the NAACP which included membership rosters 
with members’ identities.  Id. at 453-454. 
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Applying a strict scrutiny analysis the Court held that Alabama’s requirements of disclosure 
were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.59   
The Court also discussed the importance of anonymity in regard to association.  Justice 
Harlan held that speech and association were related and that associations result in “effective 
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones.”60  Speech 
and association are viewed as part of the same “liberty” interests “assured by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”61 
The Supreme Court held that the NAACP did not seek to be exempt from Alabama 
laws.62  Rather, the Court held mandatory disclosure of NAACP membership lists were an 
infringement of the NAACP’s members’ freedom of association.63  Alabama’s argument for 
obtaining these membership lists were not related to the political message of the NAACP.64  
Alabama sought the membership lists in order to determine whether the NAACP is a foreign 
corporation that had to register with the state.65  The Court found this reasoning unconvincing 
especially since the NAACP had complied with all of the document requests of the Circuit Court 
except the membership lists.66 
Justice Harlan commented on the negative impact such compelled disclosure would have 
writing, “inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be 
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses 
dissident beliefs.”67  The Court also cited the reasoning behind the NAACP’s reluctance to 
                                                          
59 Id. at 460-461, 466. 
60 Id. at 460. 
61 Id. at 460. 
62 Id. at 463. 
63 Id. at 462. 
64 Id. at 464. 
65 Id. at 464. 
66 Id. at 464. 
67 Id. at 462. 
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release their Alabama membership lists.68  Justice Harlan wrote, “Petitioner [NAACP] has made 
an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file 
members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of 
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”69  The Court was also concerned 
about the potential chilling effect this forced revelation could have on political association.70  
There was a fear that compelled disclosure of membership in the Alabama NAACP would not 
only drive current members out of the organization, but potential members would be afraid to 
join because of the negative collateral consequences of disclosed membership.71 
The association right of individuals was revisited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley 
v. Valeo (Buckley).72 Buckley concerned many laws the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) 
had promulgated concerning campaign finance.73  The Supreme Court once again held that 
government laws concerning association rights of were reviewed using strict scrutiny.74  
However, the Court made a point to note that this scrutiny level did not mean that all government 
regulations of association are automatically struck down.75  The majority held that association 
was a fundamental right, but that there was no “absolute” right to associate in “political 
activities.”76   
The majority also recognized the importance of anonymity within political association.77  
The majority in Buckley recognized that the government must meet “exacting scrutiny” in order 
                                                          
68 Id. at 462. 
69 Id. at 462. 
70 Id. at 462-463. 
71 Id. at 463. 
72 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 75. 
75 Id. at 25 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2891 (1973)). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 64-74. 
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to compel political groups to disclose the identities of their members.78  “Exacting scrutiny” is 
interpreted as requiring the government to have “a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ 
between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed.”79  The Supreme 
Court emphasized that a “mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest” was not 
enough to overcome this exacting scrutiny standard.80  The Court justified this high level of 
scrutiny stating that “compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the 
exercise of First Amendment rights.”81  
Justice Thomas recently discussed his ideas concerning the importance of anonymous 
association in his concurring opinion in Citizens United v. FEC (Citizens United).82  Citizens 
United, like Buckley, concerned campaign finance laws.83  Justice Thomas’ concurrence in 
Citizens United discussed the importance of anonymous speech and reiterated his idea first 
articulated in McIntyre that anonymous speech was intrinsic to the First Amendment.84  Citing 
examples of the negative treatment political donors have received because of their political 
contributions; Justice Thomas emphasized the importance of anonymity within the political 
world.85   
                                                          
78 Id. at 64, 64-65. 
79 Id. at 64 (citing Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F.Supp. 248, 257 (E.D. Ark.) aff’d, 393 U.S. 14, 89 S.Ct. 47 (1968)).  In 
Buckley the government gave three reasons for the compelling state interests requiring the disclosure of campaign 
contributors’ identities.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976).  The interests were (1) voters needed to know 
where campaign contributions came from in order to evaluate the candidates; (2) mandatory disclosure reduces 
misconduct on the part of the candidates; and (3) disclosure permits for a more detailed account of contributions so 
misconduct can be found.  Id.  Ultimately the Supreme Court found all three of these reasons to qualify as 
“substantial government interests.”  Id. at 68.  
80 Id. at 64.  The Supreme Court noted that laws that require the disclosure of associations’ members can arise both 
as “direct government action” and as “unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct.”  Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 (1976). 
81 Id. at 66. 
82 Citizens United v. FEC, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 876, 980 (2010). 
83 Id.; Buckley, 424 U.S. 1. 
84 Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 980; McIntyre, 362 U.S. at 370. 
85 Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 980. 
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One example of political retribution concerned the controversy over California’s 
Proposition 8 which banned gay marriage.86  The mandatory disclosure requirements of all 
contributors to either side of the issue resulted in particularly dangerous harassment of those who 
were in favor of banning gay marriage.87  Justice Thomas pointed to this harassment as an 
illustration of why anonymity is important.88  He wrote, “The success of such intimidation tactics 
has apparently spawned a cottage industry that uses forcibly disclosed donor information to pre-
empt citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights [original emphasis].”89  In examining the 
intimidation in the Proposition 8 debate and the 2008 presidential election Justice Thomas held 
that compelled identification of political donors should not be required.90  Justice Thomas wrote 
that mandatory disclosure of political contributions ultimately reduces the amount of people 
contributing to political campaigns and thus reduces individuals’ free speech rights.91 
II. Online Defamation, Anonymous Speech, and ISP Subpoenas 
 The invention and growth of the Internet has created many issues within the First 
Amendment.  The United States Supreme Court recognized the “phenomenal” growth of the 
Internet.92  The Court held in Reno v. ACLU that government regulation of speech on the 
Internet “is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”93  
Internet anonymity has been viewed as highly important; one California Court of Appeals held 
“the use of a pseudonymous screen name offers a safe outlet for the user to experiment with 
                                                          
86 Id.   
87 Id.  In one instance gay marriage advocates posted the names and addresses of supporters of Proposition 8 on a 
website.  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 980 (2010).   Other instances of harassment included damaging 
property and personal threats directed toward Proposition 8 supporters. Id. at 980. 
88 Id. at 981. 
89 Id. at 981. 
90 Id.   
91 Id. Justice Thomas cites an example in which a man did not want to contribute to a political campaign because he 
feared if his candidate lost the winner would seek retribution against him.  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct  876, 
981 (2010).   
92 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997). 
93 Id. at 885. 
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novel ideas, express unorthodox political views, or criticize corporate or individual behavior 
without fear of intimidation or reprisal.”94  However, with the advent of the Internet and blogs 
came the problem online anonymous libel.  As one court noted, “When vigorous criticism 
descends into defamation …constitutional protection is no longer available.”95  The issue of 
online defamation is a byproduct of the type of Internet communication which oftentimes is “a 
vehicle for emotional catharsis.”96  Since these bloggers and authors of web postings are 
anonymous, defamation plaintiffs must first file a John Doe lawsuit and try to make the ISP 
divulge the identity of the anonymous author before they can proceed further with the lawsuit.97  
This demand places ISPs in a precarious situation because they must comply with court 
orders but wish to make money and gain popularity with users.98  Telling defamation plaintiffs 
the identity of their customers make ISPs do something that is antithetical to their business 
interests.99  The Virginia Circuit Court in AOL recognized that if courts made ISPs release the 
names of their users “one could reasonably predict that AOL subscribers would look to AOL’s 
competitors for anonymity.”100   
Likewise Courts have grappled with striking a balance between free speech rights of 
anonymous online authors and defamation plaintiffs’ rights to sue.101  With that pervasive 
problem courts across the United States have devised tests that can be characterized as either 
pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant.102  The Maryland Court of Appeals summarized this tension 
holding “we are cognizant that setting too low a threshold would limit free speech on the 
                                                          
94 Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal.App. 4th 1154, 1162 (2008), 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Cal. App. 2008). 
95 Id. at 1164. 
96 Id. at 1163. 
97 AOL, 2000 WL 1210372, *1. 
98 Id. at *5. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at *5. 
101 America Online, 2000 WL 1210372; Dendrite, No. 3, 342 N.J. Super 134 (2001), 775 A.2d 756 (2001); Cahill, 
884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
102 Id.  
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Internet, while setting too high a threshold could unjustifiably inhibit a plaintiff with a 
meritorious defamation claim from pursuit of that cause of action.”103  However, one scholar 
noted that “when expressive speech is at issue, as in defamation cases, courts tend to apply a 
high burden test.”104   
A.  Pro-Plaintiff Tests 
The genesis of tests for ISP subpoenas began with the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California in 1999 in Columbia Ins. v. Seescandy.com [Seescandy].105  In Seescandy 
the District Court required a plaintiffs’ to satisfy a four part test in order to obtain the identity of 
an anonymous online user.106  Seescandy was decided in the early days of the Internet and 
concerned a trademark infringement action.107  An attempt to create a test to evaluate subpoenas 
in online defamation cases came in 2000 by the Circuit Court of Virginia in the case of In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online (AOL).108  In that case five anonymous bloggers 
wrote several detrimental comments in an online chat room about a publically traded 
company.109  The company argued that the statements were untrue and brought a defamation suit 
against the anonymous bloggers.110  The company requested the ISP AOL to voluntarily release 
                                                          
103 Independent Newspapers v. Brodie, 407 Md. 415 (2009). 
104 Kissinger and Larsen, 13 No. 9 J. Internet L. at 18. 
105 Columbia Ins. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (W.D. Cal. 1999). 
106 Id. at 578-580.  Seescandy did not concern an issue of defamation but of trademark infringement.  Columbia Ins. 
v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 575-576 (W.D. Cal. 1999).  However, the District Court surmised that 
defamation issues would present themselves on the Internet.  Id. at 578.  The four-part test required a plaintiff to:  
(1) Attempt to “identify the missing party with sufficient specificity;”  (2) “identify all previous steps taken to locate 
the elusive defendant;”  (3) “establish to the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiffs’ suit…could withstand a motion to 
dismiss;” (4) “file a request for discovery…along with a statement of reasons justifying the specific discovery 
requested as well as identification of a limited number of persons or entities on whom discovery process might be 
served.”  Id. at 578-580.   
107 Id. at 575-581. 
108 AOL, 2000 WL 1210372 *8. 
109 Id. at *1.  The company in this case went by the pseudonym APTC, but remained anonymous.  In re Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to America Online Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, *1 (Va. Cir.Ct. 2000).  The company brought suit against 
the bloggers anonymously and the Virginia Court opinion does not include the company’s name only its pseudonym.   
Id.   
110 Id. 
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the anonymous bloggers identities, but AOL refused.111  The company then sought a court order 
to compel AOL to release the names of the anonymous bloggers.112    
AOL argued that requiring the release of the bloggers’ names “unreasonably impairs the First 
Amendment rights of the John Does to speak anonymously on the Internet.”113  The Virginia 
Circuit Court recognized that forcing an ISP to reveal the names of its customers presented a 
problem for ISPs as well.114  The Court said, “There can be no reasonable doubt that a disclosure 
of the names of those who support the activities of the appellants could have no result other than 
to injuriously affect the effort of appellants [AOL] to obtain financial support in promoting their 
aims and purposes.”115  Recognizing the potential business implications of forcing AOL to reveal 
the identity of its users the court said, “The subpoena duces tecum at issue potentially could have 
an oppressive effect on AOL.”116 
The court in AOL also recognized the important rights associated with anonymous speech.117  
Discussing the history of anonymous speech in America the court held, “This right [of 
anonymous speech] arises from a long tradition of American advocates speaking anonymously 
though pseudonyms, such as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay.”118  This right 
to anonymity was further linked to the Internet in that user anonymity is a large part of the 
Internet itself.119  The court held, “To fail to recognize that the First Amendment right to speak 
anonymously should be extended to communications of the Internet would require this Court to 
                                                          
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at *2. 
114 Id. at *5. 
115 Id. at *5. 
116 Id. at* 5. 
117 Id. at *6. 
118 Id. at *6. 
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ignore either United States Supreme Court precedent of the realities of speech in the twenty-first 
century.”120   
Despite this recognition of the role of anonymous speech and the Internet, the Virginia 
Circuit Court found “the right to speak anonymously is not absolute.”121  The court further held 
that there should be some balancing between “the right to communicate anonymously” and “the 
need to assure that those persons who choose to abuse the opportunities presented by this 
medium can be made to answer for such transgressions.”122  In order to balance these interests 
the Virginia Circuit Court devised a three-part analysis in deciding when to enforce an ISP 
subpoena.123  The court held that an ISP must: 
“provide information concerning the identity of a subscriber (1) when the court is satisfied 
by the pleading or evidence supplied to that court (2) that the party requesting the subpoena 
has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of conduct actionable in 
the jurisdiction where suit was filed and (3) the subpoenaed identity information is centrally 
needed to advance that claim.”124  
Ultimately the Virginia Court held that the allegedly defamed company met this test and that 
AOL had to comply with the subpoena to release the names of the anonymous bloggers.125  
                                                          
120 Id. at *6. 
121 Id. at *6. 
122 Id. at *6. 
123 Id. at *8.  The test suggested by AOL was “(1) the party seeking the information must have pled with specificity 
a prima facie claim that it is the victim of particular tortious conduct and (2) the subpoenaed identity information 
must be centrally needed to advance that claim.” In re Subpoena Decus Tecum to America Online Inc., 2000 WL 
1210372, *7 (Va.Cir. Ct. 2000).  This test was rejected by the Virginia Circuit Court at “unduly cumbersome.”  Id. 
at *7. 
124 Id. at *8. 
125 Id. 
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Courts have referred to this AOL test as a “‘good faith’ standard.”126  Another court referred to 
the test in AOL as “functionally similar to that put forth in Seescandy.Com.”127 
This AOL approach was later adapted by a Delaware trial court in Cahill v. John Doe 
Number One.128  Although the Delaware Supreme Court later reversed the Delaware Superior 
Court in Cahill, the Superior Court decision provides valuable insights and explanations of the 
AOL standard.129  The anonymous speech in the Cahill involved anonymous bloggers posting 
negative comments about a local city councilman.130  Like the Virginia Court in AOL, the 
Delaware Superior Court in Cahill recognized the anonymous speech rights for Internet users.131  
The court said, “This extension [of rights of anonymous speakers on the Internet] is appropriate 
given that the internet readily ‘facilitates the rich diverse, and far ranging exchange of ideas.’”132  
However, the trial court also pointed out that serious problems arise with anonymous Internet 
speech because Internet anonymity suffers from a large lack of “accountability” on the part of 
the speakers.133  The court pointed to a lack of an “editorial filter” and that compared to other 
mediums anonymous Internet speech was less controlled.134  The Delaware trial court feared that 
plaintiffs unable to identify their defamers would be “in the untenable situation of sitting idly by, 
without any recourse, as his [the plaintiff’s] reputation quite literally is destroyed.”135 
                                                          
126 Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal.App. 4th 1154, 1167 (2008); 72 Cal.Rptr. 3d 231, 241 (Cal. App. 2008). 
127 Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super. at 157. 
128 Cahill, 879 A.2d at 953-954.   
129 Id.; Cahill, 884  A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
130 Cahill, 879 A.2d at 946-948.  The particular facts surrounding this case are contained in the introduction of this 
article.  The bloggers’ attacks on Cahill commented on his ability to work with the Mayor of Smyrna as well as 
Cahill’s mental condition, alleged venereal diseases, alleged homosexuality, and Cahill’s relationship with his wife. 
Cahill v. John Doe No. 1, 879 A.2d 943, 946-948. 
131 Id. at 950. 
132 Id. at 950. 
133 Id. at 950. 
134 Id. at 950. 
135 Id. at 951. 
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Given these problems of anonymous Internet speech in relation to defamation the Delaware 
Superior Court in Cahill praised the standard articulated in AOL.136  The court held “the ‘good 
faith’ showing required by America Online [AOL] is not insubstantial and more than adequately 
protects against the abuse of the subpoena power by an overzealous defamation plaintiff.”137   
The trial court did have issues with the lack of definition to the “good faith basis” requirement of 
part two of the AOL test.138  The lack of definition of “good faith basis” led the trial court to use 
other methods to determine the phrase’s meaning.139  The trial court determined whether a case 
was “brought in good faith” by looking at the plaintiff’s pleadings and motions.140 This “good 
faith” was met when plaintiffs demonstrate “a legitimate basis for claiming defamation in the 
context of their particular circumstances.”141  The court emphasized that plaintiffs “need not 
establish per se defamation.”142   
The Delaware Superior Court further defined the requirements of the second and third step of 
the AOL standard.143  AOL’s second step is redefined by the Delaware trial court as “the 
identifying information sought by the subpoena must relate directly and materially to an essential 
aspect of the claim.”144  This requirement of AOL did not permit a plaintiff to obtain the identity 
of an anonymous Internet speaker on a “secondary claim.”145 
                                                          
136 Id. at 953-954. 
137 Id. at 953. 
138 Id. at 953 footnote 48.  The second part of the AOL test is “(2) that the party requesting the subpoena has a 
legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where suit 
was filed in.” In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online Inc., 2000 WL 1210372 *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000). 
139 Cahill, 879 A.2d. at 953. The Cahill court states applying the AOL “good faith” test used definitions of Delaware 
Superior Court Civil Rule 11 which uses a “subjective good faith test” as opposed to “require[ing] the plaintiff to 
plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie basis for relief.”  Cahill v. John Doe No. 1, 879 A.2d 943, 953 
(Super. Crt. Del. 2005). 
140 Id. at 954. 
141 Id. at 954. 
142 Id. at 954. 
143 Id. at 955-956. 
144 Id. at 955. 
145 Id. at 955 (citing John Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F.Supp 2d 1088, 1096 (W.D. Wash. 2001)). 
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The third step in AOL, as defined by the Delaware trial court, requires plaintiffs to show that 
“they cannot discover the identity of John Doe No. 1 by other means.”146  The Delaware Superior 
Court interpreted this requirement to mean that “the plaintiff must first attempt to locate the 
identifying information from other sources or demonstrate that it would be futile to undertake 
this effort.”147  The court stressed that just because the simplest way to obtain an anonymous 
online speaker’s identity is through an ISP does not mean that the plaintiff needs to petition an 
ISP first without pursuing other avenues of investigation.148  Ultimately the Delaware Superior 
Court in Cahill held that the plaintiffs met the AOL requirements and enforced a subpoena 
against the ISP for the identities of the anonymous bloggers in their defamation case.149 
The approach in AOL was sharply criticized by the New Jersey Superior Court in Dendrite v. 
John Doe No. 3 which addressed a similar factual situation to that in AOL.150  The Court in 
Dendrite held the AOL standard “depart[s] from traditionally-applied legal standards in 
analyzing the appropriateness of such disclosure in light of the First Amendment 
implications.”151  The D.C. Court of Appeals also criticized AOL stating the standard put forth 
by the Virginia Circuit Court “insufficiently protects a defendant’s anonymity.”152 The D.C. 
Court feared AOL’s test “strip[ed] defendants of anonymity in situations where there is no 
substantial evidence of wrongdoing.”153  Likewise, the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected 
AOL’s test stating that it lacked standards in its requirement for plaintiffs to put forth a good 
faith test because this standard “varies from state to state and, sometimes, court to court.”154  A 
                                                          
146 Id. at 955. 
147 Id. at 955. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 956. 
150 Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super 134. 
151 Id. at 157. 
152 Solers v. John Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 952 (D.C. App. 2009). 
153 Id. at 952. 
154 Independent Newspapers, 407 Md. 415, 448 (2009). 
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California Appeals Court described the AOL test as “a low threshold for disclosure….It offers no 
practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiff’s good faith and leaves the speaker with little 
protection.”155 
B. Pro-Defendant Tests 
As online defamation cases appeared in other states, courts began to develop new tests for 
enforcing ISP subpoenas.  Two states, New Jersey and Delaware, expressly rejected the pro-
plaintiff approach and created pro-defendant tests known as the Dendrite test and the Cahill 
test.156  In essence these pro-defendant tests utilize, either expressly or implicitly, a balancing of 
defamation plaintiffs’ and defendants’ rights.157  This balancing is not operationalized and courts 
are somewhat left to their own discretion of deciding when a plaintiff’s interest in knowing the 
identity of an online defendant outweighs the defendant’s anonymous speech rights.158  In 
Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3159 the New Jersey trial court refused to enforce a 
subpoena against Yahoo! to disclose the identity of an anonymous online blogger who posted 
derogatory messages concerning Dendrite Incorporation.160  The New Jersey Superior Court 
ultimately denied Dendrite Incorporation’s appeal for enforcing the subpoena against Yahoo! on 
the grounds that the company failed to meet a defamation claim’s harm element.161 
                                                          
155 Krinsky, 159 Cal.App. 4th at 1167.  This court also noted that anonymity presents other problems no matter the 
test used.  Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal.App. 4th 1154, 1167 footnote 8 (2008).  Focusing on the inherent problem of 
anonymous defendants the court noted “without knowing the defendant’s identity, a plaintiff may have difficulty 
determining whether it is financially worthwhile to pursue litigation.”  Id. at 1167 footnote 8. 
156 Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super. at 140-158.; Cahill, 884 A.2d 451.  
157 Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super. 134; Cahill, 884 A.2d 451. 
158 Id.  Cahill does use a summary judgment standard in their analysis of online defendants.  John Doe No. 1 v. 
Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).  However, this standard while providing some context for balancing does not 
precisely state what elements or factors of anonymous speech rights should be taken into consideration by courts.  
Id. 
159 Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super at 140-158. 
160 Id. at 140-141. 
161 Id. at 141. 
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The New Jersey court created a test that defamation plaintiffs must meet in order to enforce a 
subpoena against an ISP.162  This particular test involves a four-part analysis.163  The test is: 
1) Plaintiffs must “undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the 
subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to 
afford the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve 
opposition to the application.”164 
2) Plaintiffs must “set forth the exact statements” at issue that “constitutes actionable 
speech.”165 
3) Plaintiffs must “set forth a pima facie cause of action against the fictitiously-named 
anonymous defendants.”166  This requirement is interpreted as requiring the plaintiff to 
“produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of action…prior to a 
court ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed defendant.”167 
4) After these first three elements are met the Court will then “balance the defendant’s First 
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie case 
presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity.”168 
The court stated that this test was applied “case-by case” and that the “guiding principle” of the 
court’s test was a “proper balancing of the equities and rights at issue.”169 
 The Court in Dendrite created this four-part test because they recognized the importance 
of anonymous speech on the Internet.170  Citing Seescandy the Dendrite Court analyzed the 
                                                          
162 Id. at 141-142. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 141. 
165 Id. at 141. 
166 Id. at 141.  This particular requirement is further explained to require a plaintiff to “establish that is action can 
withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  Dendrite Intern., Inc. v. 
John Doe, No. 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134, 141 (2001).   
167 Id. at 141. 
168 Id. at 142. 
169 Id. at 142. 
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unique situation the Internet creates in regard to anonymous speakers.171  The federal court in 
Seescandy foresaw that the Internet created a situation where an individual could “commit 
certain tortious acts, such as defamation, copyright infringement, and trademark infringement, 
entirely online.”172  Despite this concern in Seescandy, the Dendrite decision recognized that 
courts must look to speakers’ First Amendment rights as well as defamation plaintiffs’ right to 
sue.173   
 In 2005 the Supreme Court of Delaware analyzed and incorporated parts of the Dendrite 
test in their new Cahill test.174  The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s adoption 
of the AOL standard holding that it was “concerned that setting the standard [for revealing 
anonymous online speakers] too low will chill potential posters from exercising their First 
Amendment right to speak anonymously.”175  A plaintiff’s ability to force an ISP to reveal the 
identity of an anonymous speaker is “a very important form of relief.”176  The Court feared that 
revealing an anonymous speaker could potentially subject the speaker to a whole host of negative 
collateral consequences or what the court called “extra-judicial self-help remedies.”177  In fact, 
there was some concern by the Court that some plaintiffs’ brought defamation suits solely for the 
purpose of “unmask[ing] the identities of anonymous critics.”178  
 The Delaware Supreme Court in Cahill also pointed out that the facts in their case were 
different than those in cases like AOL.179  They noted that in Cahill the anonymous speech 
concerned a politician and his role as a city councilman, rather than a business and its practices 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
170 Id. at 148-149. 
171 Id. at 150-152 (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999)). 
172 Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy, 185 F.R.D 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
173 Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super. at 150. 
174 Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
175 Id., at 457. 
176 Id. at 457. 
177 Id. at 457. 
178 Id. at 457. 
179 Id.  
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like that found in AOL.180  Given the Cahill court’s uneasiness with forcing ISPs to reveal the 
identities of their users the court adopted a variation of the Dendrite test.181  However, the Court 
explicitly noted that they were not following the entire Dendrite standard.182  Rather, the Cahill 
test is described as a “summary judgment standard.”183  This standard was used to “strike the 
balance between a defamation plaintiff’s right to protect his reputation and a defendant’s right to 
exercise free speech anonymously.”184   
 The Supreme Court of Delaware pointed out specific parts of the Dendrite test that it was 
expressly abandoning.185  The Court held “we do not think that the second and fourth prongs of 
the Dendrite test are necessary.”186  The second prong of Dendrite “require[s] the plaintiff to 
identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster 
that…constitutes anonymous speech.”187  The Supreme Court of Delaware viewed this prong as 
unnecessary in light of using a “summary judgment inquiry” which would essentially require this 
identification of statements by the plaintiff.188  The fourth prong of Dendrite holds “the court 
must balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the 
strength of the prima facie case presented.”189  This requirement was also viewed as unnecessary 
by the Delaware Supreme Court because “the summary judgment test is itself the balance.”190  In 
sum the Cahill test for determining when an ISP must release the identity of an anonymous user 
to a defamation plaintiff is defined as being “a modified Dendrite standard consisting only of 
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181 Id. at 460-462. 
182 Id. at 460. 
183 Id. at 460. 
184 Id. at 460. 
185 Id. at 461. 
186 Id. at 461. 
187 Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super. at 141. 
188 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461. 
189 Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super. at 142. 
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Dendrite requirements one and three:  the plaintiff must make reasonable efforts to notify the 
defendant and must satisfy the summary judgment standard.”191  Using this new standard the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that the statements made about Robert Cahill and his wife were 
opinion and “therefore, incapable of a defamatory meaning” thus failing to “satisfy the summary 
judgment standard.”192   
 One criticism of these pro-defendant tests is that they have, according to one scholar, 
“made the outcome of lawsuits for online defamation difficult to predict.”193  The original trial 
court in Cahill sharply criticized the Dendrite test.194  The Cahill trial court agreed with the 
plaintiff’s characterization of the Dendrite test as being a standard that “requires too much.”195  
The Dendrite test was seen as requiring a plaintiff to “answer what is tantamount to a motion to 
dismiss before the plaintiff can learn the identity of the speaker he claims has defamed him.”196  
The court further criticized Dendrite holding “under Dendrite, the plaintiff is put to the nearly 
impossible task of demonstrating as a matter of law that a publication is defamatory before he 
serves his compliant or even knows the identity of the defendant(s).”197    
                                                          
191 Id. at 461.  The Supreme Court of Delaware pointed out that this standard would be applied in any anonymous 
libel case regardless of the medium at issue.  John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 465 (Del. 2005).  The Court 
noted however that even though this standard was applied universally “certain factual and contextual issues relevant 
to chat rooms and blogs are particularly important in analyzing the defamation claim itself.”  Id. at 465.  
Recognizing the hierarchy in online speech the Court further held that certain Internet forums, such as “Blogs and 
chat rooms,” have speech that is clearly “not a source of facts of data” but are simply “vehicles for the expression of 
opinions.”  Id. at 465. 
192 Id. at 467.  The Supreme Court of Delaware made a point to note that “no reasonable person could have 
interpreted these statements as being anything other than opinion.”  John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d. 451, 467 
(Del. 2005).  The Court pointed out that other posters on the blog criticized the John Doe’s postings and that the 
blog itself was “dedicated to opinions about issues in Smyrna” [original emphasis]. Id. at 467. 
193 Jessica Chilson, Student Author, Unmasking John Doe:  Setting a Standard for Discovery in Anonymous Internet 
Defamation Cases, 95 Va. L. Rev. 389, 416 (2009). 
194 Cahill, 879 A.2d at 948-949; 951-953. 
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196 Id. at 952. 
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 Other criticisms of the Dendrite test center on the balancing requirement.198  The Illinois 
Appellate Court held that there was a logical flaw in balancing the anonymous speech interests 
of online speakers verses the plaintiff’s prima facie case.199  The Court held that since by this 
stage of the Dendrite test the plaintiff had already made out a prima facie case for defamation it 
was illogical to balance the interests of the two parties since there is “no first-amendment right to 
defame.”200 
 Cahill’s pro-defendant summary judgment standard has also been criticized.  The 
Maryland Court of Appeals held that Cahill test is “setting the bar too high…to require plaintiffs 
to meet a summary judgment standard…would undermine personal accountability and the search 
for truth, by requiring claimants to essentially prove their case before even knowing who the 
commentator was.”201 In Krinsky a California appellate court also noted that the summary 
judgment standard was bad in general application because there is no uniform standard for 
summary judgment.202   
The Cahill test also has been attacked because of the amount of specificity a plaintiff 
must have in their pleadings to overcome a summary judgment standard.203  The District Court of 
Massachusetts held that “bare assertions in an affidavit are not adequate to defeat summary 
judgment, as the plaintiff must adduce specific facts.”204  The U.S. District Court of Connecticut 
sharply criticized the Cahill standard as being “potentially confusing and also difficult for a 
plaintiff to satisfy when she has been unable to conduct any discovery at this juncture.”205  The 
Connecticut District Court even went as far to say that overcoming the Cahill standard may be 
                                                          
198 Maxon v. Ottowa Publishing Co., 929 N.E. 2d 666, 676. (Ill.App. 2010); 341 Ill. Dec. 12, 22 (2010). 
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202 Krinsky, 159 Cal.App. 4th at 1170. 
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“impossible to meet…for any cause of action which required evidence within the control of the 
defendant.”206  At least one Court held that the summary judgment standard in Cahill did not 
even adequately address the Court’s concern of chilled speech effects.207  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that a motion to dismiss standard was better than the Cahill summary 
judgment standard because it better protects the anonymity of the defendants.208 
 Despite the criticism of the pro-defendant stances of Dendrite and Cahill, many courts 
have adopted these standards for reviewing ISP subpoenas.  As recent as July 2010 the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Washington adopted a variation of the Dendrite 
standard holding that a plaintiff must meet the requirements of notice; presentation of a prima 
facie case; and proving the importance of the defendant’s identity to “the plaintiff’s case.”209  
Once these standards were met the plaintiff’s case would undergo Dendrite balancing.210  Citing 
the importance of anonymous speech verses plaintiff’s rights, the U.S. District Court of 
Connecticut held that the prima facie standard announced in Dendrite “strikes the most 
appropriate balance between the First Amendment rights of the defendant and the interest in the 
plaintiff of pursuing their claims.”211 
 Cahill’s summary judgment standard has also received praise from various courts. The 
Court of Appeals of Texas adopted the Cahill test holding that the summary judgment standard 
was best because it protected anonymous speech.212  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
                                                          
206 Id. at 256. 
207 Lassa v. Rongstad, 294 Wis.2d 187, 214-215 (2006), 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006). 
208 Id. at 215. 
209 Salehoo Group, Ltd. v. ABC Co., 2010 WL 2773801, *4-*5 (W.D. Wash 2010). 
210 Id. at *5. 
211 Doe I and Doe II, 561 F.Supp. 2d at 256. 
212 In re Does, 242 S.W.3d 805, 822-823 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 
 
28 
 
Circuit also held in 2010 that Cahill was “the most exacting standard” and that a District Court 
did not err in applying it.213   
C. Hybrid Tests 
 Despite the pervasiveness of the AOL, Dendrite, and Cahill tests, some courts have 
created their own tests to analyze anonymous speaker subpoenas.214  Like other pro-defendant 
tests these approaches provide a balancing, or at least some analysis, of plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ interests.215  One U.S. District Court extrapolated anonymous speaker subpoena 
standards in defamation cases to issues concerning illegal Internet file sharing.216  In Sony Music 
Entertainment v. Does the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York created a 
four-part test to determine when a court should enforce a subpoena on an ISP to reveal an 
anonymous user.217  The four-part test requires plaintiffs to prove: 
1) “prima facie case of copyright infringement;”218 
2) “specificity of the discovery request;”219 
3) “absence of alternative means to obtain subpoenaed information;”220 
4) “ central need for subpoenaed information;”221 
5) Analysis of the “defendant’s expectation of privacy.”222 
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This approach has gained some popularity with a New York state trial court which adopted this 
standard in 2005; the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 2008; and in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina in 2009.223   
 Other courts have used a variation of the Dendrite test.224  In the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California used a two-part Dendrite variation in which a plaintiff had to 
prove (1) “support a pima facie case on all elements” and a (2) balancing of the plaintiff’s rights 
verses the defendant’s anonymous speech rights.225  The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Connecticut adopted a hybrid of Dendrite standards in 2008.226  The Court incorporated 
Dendrite’s prima facie case standard and balancing test in order to determine if an ISP had to 
release the names of anonymous users who allegedly committed defamation.227   
Some courts have also used a variation of the Cahill summary judgment standard.228 The 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals created a five-step test using the Cahill summary 
judgment standard.229  This five-part test included elements of notice and giving the defendant 
enough time to respond to the subpoena.230  The Court of Appeals of Arizona also used a Cahill 
test coupled with Dendrite balancing.231  The Court held that while Cahill’s summary judgment 
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standard is appropriate it does not allow courts to analyze the importance of anonymous 
speech.232  Given this criticism of Cahill the Arizona court added the Dendrite balancing test to 
Cahill’s summary judgment analysis.233  The Court held that this balancing was important for 
courts because there were “a vast array of factually distinct cases likely to involve anonymous 
speech.”234 
 Still other courts have created their own standards for evaluating ISP subpoenas.235  The 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana found that none of the common 
approaches to enforcing an ISP subpoena “satisfactory.”236  The Court criticized other efforts to 
protect the identity of anonymous speakers since plaintiffs could conceivably learn the identity 
of John Doe defendants by means other than a subpoena.237  The District Court created a test that 
required plaintiffs to have “a showing of at least a reasonable probability or a reasonable 
possibility of recovery on the defamation claim.”238  This test has actually received one scholar’s 
support.239  Jessica Chilton wrote that the test devised by the Louisiana District Court “provides 
the best method for resolving discovery question in John Doe defamation cases while also laying 
the groundwork for a comparison with other standards promulgated by the courts.”240   
 The issue with all of these hybrid tests is that they, like all pro-defendant tests, provide no 
real context in which to strike the appropriate balance between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ rights.  
Additionally, these tests leave too much subjectivity to the court in applying these tests.  Using 
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these approaches presents is a real situation where the outcome of a suit would depend largely 
upon the judge’s independent viewpoints in making the decision.  Even the test articulated by the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana provides no real protection for 
anonymous speech.241  That court’s analysis of the success of a plaintiff’s claim allows for the 
same undefined subjective reasoning of other hybrid tests.242 
III. A New Approach to ISP Subpoenas:  Introducing  the “Anonymous Public Concern 
Test” 
Given the shortcomings of pro-plaintiff, pro-defendant, and hybrid tests a new test is needed 
to evaluate when an ISP should release the name of a speaker in an online defamation suit.  The 
major shortcoming in all of the current tests is striking the right balance between plaintiffs and 
defendants.  Current tests are either too pro-plaintiff or too pro-defendant, which gives both sides 
an unfair advantage depending on what court they are in.  All of the tests fail to give the proper 
protection to anonymous speech and instead focus too much on the defamation claim.  A new 
test needs to be devised that gives the right amount of protection for anonymous speech.  
However, the difficulty is that this test does not need to be so encompassing that defamation 
becomes protected as well.  One scholar noted that while there is little uniformity within current 
ISP subpoena tests one thing is consistent—“courts have developed standards for unmasking 
anonymous internet speakers without regard for the content of the speech at issue.”243   
This new test would have its foundation in the Supreme Court’s holdings that anonymous 
speech is protected under the First Amendment.244  Likewise the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
discussion of the importance of anonymous speech has made in shaping the United States’ 
                                                          
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Ryan Martin, Freezing the Net:  Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standard for Unmasking Anonymous Internet 
Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1217, 1237 (2007). 
244 Talley, 362 U.S. 60; McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; Buckley, 424 U.S. 1. 
 
 
32 
 
history, particularly the history surrounding the ratification of the Constitution, underscores the 
importance anonymous speech in American discourse.245  Only the Dendrite balancing test 
provides an actual step that takes into account the importance of anonymous speech.246  
However, any balancing needs guidelines for courts.   
Workplace speech regulation within the government provides a good framework for 
evaluating speech rights against other concerns such as defamation plaintiffs’ rights.  Unlike the 
balancing in different ISP subpoena tests, the balancing used in workplace speech cases is 
operationalized.247  Because of this operationalization public concern analysis should be 
incorporated into lower courts’ tests for enforcement of ISP subpoenas.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that public concern speech is so important that government employees who engage in 
disruptive workplace speech cannot be fired in some instances where the speech itself touches on 
“matters of public concern.”248  Pickering’s analysis of “matters of public concern” speech and 
its relationship to government employees provides an interesting model that can be used to create 
a new test for determining when an ISP must disclose the identity of its users to defamation 
plaintiffs.249 
 In Pickering v. Board of Education the U.S. Supreme Court devised a two-part test used 
to determine when a government employee could be fired from their job because of disruptive 
speech.250  The first part of this test determines whether the speech focuses on “matters of public 
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concern.”251  If the speech is touches on “matters of public concern,” the second part of the test is 
a balancing of the value of the speech against the government’s interest in preserving 
“efficiency” within the office.252  The Court addressed the balancing of untrue speech in this 
equation.253  In discussing false statements made by government employees, the U.S. Supreme 
Court focused on the effects of the speech on the workplace more than the falsity itself.254  
Writing for the majority Justice Marshall held that “matters of public concern” was so important 
under the First Amendment that even government employees’ criticism of their employers can 
sometimes be protected.255 
 The protection of “matters of public concern” was revisited by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Connick v. Myers.256  Justice White, writing for the majority, reiterated the principles of the 
Pickering balancing test and the role of “matters of public concern.”257  When speech is not 
considered a “matter of public concern” by the courts there is no need for any balancing and an 
employee’s termination is not afforded Pickering analysis.258  However, in order to determine if 
an employee’s speech is a “matter of public concern” the Court uses “the content, form, and 
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”259  While neither Pickering nor 
Connick provide a concrete explanation of what “matters of public concern” are, it is evident by 
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these cases that it is essentially self-defining.260  As the case in Connick illustrates speech taken 
as a whole can contain both a “matter of public concern” and other types of speech that are not 
afforded First Amendment protection.261  However, Connick holds that finding that speech is a 
“matter of public concern” is only the first part of the analysis.262  After determining speech is 
about “matters of public concern” that speech is weighed against the employer’s interests in 
office efficiency; and, as in Connick, employees speaking on “matters of public concern” can 
still be Constitutionally fired from their government jobs.263  
This article’s proposed “Anonymous Public Concern Test” incorporates the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s view of protection for anonymous speech and public concern in its three-part analyses 
for evaluating ISP subpoenas.  Borrowing from the standards of Pickering and Connick, courts 
should (1) evaluate whether the anonymous online speech at issues touches on “matters of public 
concern.”264  If the online speech meets this first test then the court then (2) determines whether 
the plaintiff’s need to know the defendant’s identity substantially outweighs the defendant’s right 
to anonymity.  If the court determines the plaintiff’s interest substantially outweighs the 
speaker’s anonymity rights the court (3) evaluates the plaintiff’s claim using the “good faith” test 
outlined by the Virginia Circuit Court in AOL.265  It is important to note that if the Court 
                                                          
260 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Connick, 461 U.S. at 145-147.  Pickering held that a school teacher’s letter regarding 
the school board decisions regarding taxes were “matters of public concern.”  Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 569-570 (1968).  The Supreme Court in Connick held that the employee’s office survey did not contain 
“matters of public concern” where the employee’s questionnaire concerned issues that were relevant only to the 
employee or to the office personnel themselves.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148-149 (1983).  However, one 
question did rise to the level of public concern which as an inquiry on whether employees in the District Attorney’s 
Office felt compelled to “‘work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates’.”  Id. at 149. 
261 Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-149. 
262 Id. at 149-150. 
263 Id. at 154.  
264 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Connick, 461 U.S. 145-147. 
265 AOL, 2000 WL 1210372 at *8. 
 
 
35 
 
determines that the anonymous speech does not qualify as “matters of public concern” the court 
skips the second step and goes straight to the AOL test.266   
A.  An Analysis of the “Anonymous Public Concern Test” 
This next section takes this proposed test and analyzes each part in order to demonstrate how 
courts would apply it in real-world situations.  After each of these elements are discussed, the 
“Anonymous Public Concern Test” will be applied to the online statements made by anonymous 
bloggers in Cahill.267  Through this analysis this new test will be shown to protect anonymous 
speakers’ rights as well as placing reasonable requirements on defamation plaintiffs. 
Step 1.  “Matters of Public Concern”268 
This part of the test serves to protect important online commentary that may take the form of 
high value political speech.  Conversely, this analysis helps to weed-out unprotected defamatory 
speech.  If the court were to determine the speech was not “matters of public concern” then the 
speech would skip the balancing test and go straight to the Step 3 AOL test.269   
It is important for courts to have standards in determining what are “matters of public 
concern.”270  As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Connick, “matters of public concern” are 
determining by the “content, form and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole 
record.”271  The U.S. Supreme Court gave further guidance on what constitutes public concern 
holding that “public concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a 
subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication.”272  
For the purposes of determining if a comment addresses “matters of public concern” this 
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proposed test would not allow a plaintiff to separate out individual phrases from a speaker’s 
overall message.273  In utilizing this method, courts should look to the overall message of the 
commentary.  If the overall message is one that is constitutes “matters of public concern” then 
the court should go through the Step 2 balancing and Step 3 AOL analysis.274  While this 
proposed method not separating defamatory statements from the whole message may seem 
unduly harsh to plaintiffs it serves the practical function of judicial economy.  The nature of 
online statements is different than those of the written word.  Since online writers oftentimes 
write without much editing or pre-writing it is appropriate to analyze commentary as a whole, 
rather than individual statements.  Since mixed messages still would go through balancing and 
the AOL test, this method would not necessarily allow defamatory speech to go unpunished.275   
Step 2.  Balancing Speakers’ and Plaintiffs’ Rights 
If the online speech in question is determined to be “matters of public concern,” the court 
then balances the anonymous speaker’s interest in remaining unidentified against the plaintiff’s 
interest in discovering the speaker’s true identity.276  This balancing is a crucial part of this new 
test.  This element is modeled on the balancing found in the Dendrite test.277  However, unlike 
Dendrite, this balancing is operationalized and does not occur after a court makes the 
determination of whether a plaintiff has a legitimate defamation claim.278  This 
operationalization is important because it remedies the unpredictability of other tests as well as 
provides courts with some rubric in analyzing anonymous speakers’ and defamation plaintiffs’ 
rights.  It is essential to establish a standard for courts to follow in balancing.  Balancing in 
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general is crucial to ISP subpoenas because it provides a protection for anonymous speech.  The 
balancing permits the courts the ability to quickly identify truly frivolous defamation claims as 
well as baseless assertions for the preservation of anonymity for online speakers.  Providing a 
framework in which courts conduct this balancing also allows for consistency in the courts. 
Designing a test in which a court balances the anonymous speaker’s and plaintiff’s interest 
early on also provides for judicial economy. Unlike other tests which rely on implicit balancing 
such as Cahill or balancing after the fact such as Dendrite, this initial balancing allows courts to 
directly grapple with the issues of a speaker’s right to remain anonymous in light of the 
plaintiff’s defamation allegations.279  It is important for judges to address these issues of 
anonymous speech rights directly given the history of anonymous speech and the importance the 
U.S. Supreme Court has given it in Talley and McIntyre.280  
The standard for balancing these interests will be the “exacting scrutiny” standard.281  The 
U.S. Supreme Court in McIntyre held that “exacting scrutiny” meant that government action 
must be “narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”282  In Citizens United the U.S. 
Supreme Court held “‘exacting scrutiny’ requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure 
requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.”283   This standard was created 
to present a high hurdle for government action against anonymous speech.  While not impossible 
to overcome, a government entity, such as a trial court enforcing an ISP subpoena, must analyze 
the important interests of anonymous speakers.  
The interests of a defamation plaintiff are evident.  Plaintiffs’ interests are seeking a remedy 
for online libel and clearing their besmirched names.  However, the interests of anonymous 
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speakers vary.  First, there is the interest in engaging in dialog about important political issues 
that could otherwise be silenced.  Second, there is the interest of speaking freely in an open 
dialog about issues that are true concerns of society.  Third, and perhaps most important, is the 
interest in speaking on a subject without the fear of reprisal.  It was this interest the U.S. 
Supreme Court first addressed this concern in NAACP, and it is this issue that leads to the 
concerns of chilling effects on anonymous speech.284   These interests of anonymous speakers 
must be taken into account by the courts engaging in this balancing.  These issues are important 
to preserving the integrity of anonymous speech and therefore should be the main factors courts 
analyze in this new balancing test. 
Courts can include other factors within their analysis.  For instance, the amount of attention 
an online posting has received, where the posting was located on the Internet, and the public 
figure/private citizen status of the plaintiff all come into courts’ balancing.  While some of these 
factors may be part of the plaintiff’s own determination to bring a defamation suit, they are 
important for courts to consider when evaluating whether to reveal a defendant’s identity.   
This balancing test does present an advantage for anonymous speakers.  However, plaintiffs 
can succeed in this test if they can show that the speakers’ rights are not at danger.  Plaintiffs can 
point to the low-value of the speech at issue; the lack of potential retribution toward other 
anonymous speakers in similar situations; and the great interest the plaintiff has in clearing his or 
her own name.  The balancing somewhat determines just how important “matters of public 
concern” are, and affords plaintiffs the right to sue for defamation on low level speech that is of 
little value to the community.285   
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Step 3.  AOL Test286 
If a plaintiff’s rights outweigh an anonymous speaker’s right to preserve their anonymity the 
court then must analyze the plaintiff’s case under the AOL standard.287  This standard set forth 
by the Virginia Circuit Court states a defamation plaintiff can enforce a subpoena for an 
anonymous speaker’s identity: 
“(1) when the court is satisfied by the pleading or evidence supplied to that court (2) that the 
party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the 
victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where suit was filed and (3) the subpoenaed 
identity information is centrally needed to advance that claim.”288   
This standard is important for this new “Anonymous Public Concern Test” because it provides 
courts the opportunity to remove truly frivolous lawsuits while simultaneously placing a low 
burden on defamation plaintiffs.   
This test has been criticized by the court in Cahill because it seemingly places too low a 
burden on defamation plaintiffs.289  However, in the context of this new rule this test strikes the 
appropriate balance.  Step 1 and Step 2 of the “Anonymous Public Concern Test” are designed to 
protect anonymous speech and place an extremely high hurdle for defamation plaintiffs.  
However, if a plaintiff is able to meet both of these requirements, especially the balancing, then 
courts should allow them to proceed under this AOL standard.290  By allowing plaintiffs to put 
forth only a “legitimate, good faith basis” for a claim, most plaintiffs will be able to proceed with 
enforcing a subpoena on an ISP.291   
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This easy hurdle for plaintiffs does not come at the price of anonymous speech since the 
balancing test rigorously defends anonymous speech.  If a plaintiff gets to this stage of the 
analysis there is good reason to speculate that they not only actually have more than a 
“legitimate, good faith basis” for their suit, but a winnable defamation case.292  If a defamation 
plaintiff gets to this stage and cannot meet the AOL requirements then their case falls into the 
category of a seriously flawed lawsuit.293   
B.  Application of the “Anonymous Public Concern Test” 
This section serves to illustrate three different types of statements this new “Anonymous 
Public Concern Test” may confront.  What follows is an analysis of three different statements 
from the Cahill case involving anonymous online postings about Councilman Cahill.294  Each of 
the comments analyzed presents a different analysis under the “Anonymous Public Concern 
Test.”  This analysis underscores why this proposed test is the best approach when dealing with 
anonymous speakers’ and plaintiffs’ rights. 
Quote 1: “If only Councilman Cahill was able to display the same leadership skills energy 
and enthusiasm toward the revitalization and growth of the fine town of Smyrna as Mayor 
Schaeffer has demonstrated! While Mayor Schaeffer has made great strides toward improving 
the livelihood of Smyrna’s citizens, Cahill has devoted all of his energy to being a divisive 
impediment to any kind of cooperative movement.”295  
Application of Test:   
1)  Does this qualify as “matters of public concern?”296  Answer:  Yes.   
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This commentary deals with political issues within a local community and the political 
ability of a city councilman.  The subject of this speech is similar to that in Pickering in that it 
deals with an important local issue, namely the capability of Councilman Cahill to serve his 
constituency.297   
2) Balancing Plaintiff’s Rights Against Anonymous Speaker’s Rights:  Answer:  The courts 
balancing in this scenario should favor the anonymous speaker.   
The speech at issue is political speech which is important to the community and to citizens of 
Smyrna.  It addresses local politics that is affecting the community and represents a citizen’s 
thoughts on local issues.  Most importantly if this speaker’s identity was revealed his or her 
speech may be chilled.  This is the type of speech that anonymity is designed to protect.     
The plaintiff’s interest here is uncovering the identity of the speaker so the plaintiff can 
proceed with a defamation suit.  However, the commentary here is not the type that would 
warrant a plaintiff trying to clear his name.  Rather, it seems that a plaintiff seeking a defamation 
suit in this type of case may have an interest in finding out the identity of their political foe, 
which, in turn, could lead to retributive actions on the part of the plaintiff—something that would 
chill this speech. This fear of retribution is more palpable in this case since this involves local 
politics which is more focused on a particular community that national or even state politics.  
The plaintiff has a relative weak interest in forcing the ISP to reveal the identity of the 
anonymous speaker.  Conversely, the anonymous speaker has great interest in preserving their 
identity, especially given the nature of the speech.  Therefore the balancing in this case favors the 
anonymous speaker and the ISP will not be forced to reveal the identity of the online blogger. 
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3) AOL Test298:  Answer:  No application of the AOL test since the defendant speaker’s right to 
remain anonymous outweighs the plaintiff’s right to uncover the defendant’s identity in Step 
2.299   
If for some reason the court balanced this speech in favor of the plaintiff and AOL was applied 
the plaintiff would probably still fail.300  Given that the speech in question is political opinion it 
would be difficult for the plaintiff to put forth a “good faith” claim.301  This demonstrates how 
this extra layer of analysis still protects the anonymous speaker. 
Quote 2:  “You’re right about Cahill’s wife.  Word is she left him…couldn’t have sex because he 
has Hepititis [sic] C.  Now she’s living in Dover with her BIG blond girlfriend and they both go 
out to the bars most nights trying to pick up guys.  I saw her the [sic] out the other night trying to 
pick up some guys.  The guy was so drink [sic] he didn’t even know how…looking [sic] she was 
and they left together.”302 
Application of Test: 
1) Does this qualify as “matters of public concern?”303  Answer:  No.   
This commentary is entirely personal in nature and concerns the Councilman’s marriage and 
relationship with his wife.  The information concerning the Councilman having Hepatitis C is 
private and does not concern a matter related to his role as a politician.  While this posting may 
be interesting to some readers for the sensational comments made, this does not rise to the level 
of public concern.  The Court should skip the balancing step and go straight to the AOL test.304  
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2) Balancing Plaintiff’s Rights Against Anonymous Speaker’s Rights:  Answer:  No 
balancing necessary since the statements do not meet the requirements of “matters of 
public concern.”305 
  Even if this court did find that the information in this comment was “matters of public 
concern” the balancing would still favor the plaintiff.306  The defendant’s comments are not those 
that are of interest to the community, nor is there a risk that the anonymous speaker would be 
subjected to retribution.  The plaintiff has a strong interest in clearing his name; and this lawsuit 
is probably motivated by that goal.  The state has an “overriding state interest” in this situation 
since they would want to enforce a subpoena in a case where there was clearly malicious 
defamation not motivated by any important political or community concern.307 
3) AOL Test308:  Answer:  The test favors the plaintiff.   
The statements at issue would qualify for a “good faith basis” for a defamation claim under 
AOL.309  The statements at issue are derogatory and personal in nature.  This is an example of 
how this “Anonymous Public Concern Test” would not provide any protection for true 
defamation by anonymous speakers.  In this scenario the ISP would be required to reveal the 
names of the anonymous online speakers.  
Quote 3:  “Anyone who has spent any amount of time with Cahill would be keenly aware of such 
character flaws, not to mention an obvious mental deterioration.  Cahill is a prime example of 
failed leadership his eventual ousting is exactly what Smyrna needs in order to move forward 
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and establish a community that is able to thrive on economic stability and common pride in its 
town.”310 
Application of Test: 
1) Does this qualify as “matters of public concern?”311  Answer:  Yes.   
This commentary speaks largely to the ability of Councilman Cahill to perform his political 
duties.  It speaks directly to his service as a politician and public servant to the community.  
However, unlike the commentary in Quote 1 this comment does include a personal statement 
concerning the mental health of the councilman.  This speech addresses “matters of public 
concern” since he is a public official.312  However, unlike the pure political speech found in 
Quote 1, this comment is potentially defamatory.  Additionally this postings regarding the 
Councilman’s inability to serve seems to be predicated upon this belief of his failing mental 
health.   
2) Balancing Plaintiff’s Rights Against Anonymous Speaker’s Rights:  Answer:  This is a 
closer call, but this should favor the defendant.   
In examining the comments in this quotation it is clear that the speaker is addressing 
concerns over the Councilman’s abilities as a politician.  The public may be interested in these 
facts and this information may be important for the community at large.  The potential chilling 
effect that exposing the true identity of the speaker is similar to that in Quote 1.313 
The speaker’s commentary concerning the Councilman’s mental health presents potential 
defamation issues.  The plaintiff would argue that he has an interest in discovering the identity of 
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this speaker in order for the plaintiff to clear his name.  Stating that a politician is mentally ill is 
different than stating that he is politically inept.   
However, since this quotation deals with as assertion regarding the mental health of the 
Councilman there is a potential “overriding state interest” here in revealing the identity of the 
speaker.314  Mental health of public officials is a matter that should be important to the public.  
This is a different scenario than saying that a private individual is mentally ill, or even a well-
known celebrity, is mentally ill.  Mental illness in a political figure is public interest and public 
concern.  This goes to the ability of an individual to serve his or her community and perform 
their job satisfactorily.  Therefore, in this analysis the plaintiff’s interests should be outweighed 
by the defendant’s right to speak anonymously. 
AOL Test315:  Answer:  Another close call, but the defendant should prevail.   
Like the balancing test mentioned above, the AOL test presents a closer call.  In this 
particular case the court should not have to reach this level of analysis because the defendant’s 
interest in anonymous speech does outweigh the plaintiff’s interest.  The plaintiff in this test 
would focus on the mental health commentary and show that this made qualify as a “good faith” 
defamation claim under the AOL standard.316  The court, however, should focus on the plaintiff’s 
status as a politician and argue that this commentary is the type that politicians are regularly 
subjected to.   This political position of the plaintiff would illustrate that this is not a regular 
defamation claim.  This is a claim made by a politician in relation to an issue that, if true, is a 
major public interest.  As mentioned above the court in this case should not even reach this step.    
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Conclusion 
Anonymous speech has been important to the development of the United States Constitution 
and is important today.317  However, neither anonymous speakers nor defamation plaintiffs 
should be given free rein in our legal system.  In enforcing ISP subpoenas courts must strive to 
strike a balance between these two interests and achieve a just result that values plaintiffs’ rights 
to sue and anonymous bloggers’ right to speak.  While both federal and state courts in the U.S. 
have tried to grapple with this problem none have created a workable solution that treats 
plaintiffs and speakers equally.  The “Anonymous Public Concern Test” best addresses this 
problem and should be utilized by courts.   
This issue of anonymous speech does not stop with online defamation suits and ISP 
subpoenas.  As the Internet grows into a large space for public discourse other issues have and 
will arise.  Perhaps the rubric set forth in this study can provide some structural guidance in how 
courts should address these problems.  Further research is needed in areas concerning 
anonymous online postings in criminal cases and by third party witnesses.  Both of these topics 
illustrate how wide anonymous speech’s impact goes and the types of difficult situations courts 
find themselves in.   
Additionally, more research needs to be produced in refining the balancing of anonymous 
speakers’ rights verses those of defamation plaintiffs.  Courts need to have a more systemized 
approach in evaluating these issues.  This study seeks to address some of those concerns, but 
there is still room for advancement in this area.  As the Twenty-First Century moves on new 
problems with anonymous speech will arise.  Nonetheless, it is important for courts to place 
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those speakers’ rights in the same category as the anonymous speech that first supported the First 
Amendment and Constitution.318  
Incorporating public concern in to the analysis of ISP subpoena enforcement is an ideal 
method of protecting important online speech.  The biggest issue with any speech regulation is 
the potential chilling effect.  Online defamation suits run the risk of creating a situation where 
legitimate commentary on the Internet is silenced by offended plaintiffs who are sensitive to any 
perceived criticism.  This new test protects important anonymous online speech while not 
allowing defamation to hide behind a wide shield of protection. 
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